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CONTINGENCY AND COMMUNITY IN NORMATIVE
PRACTICE*
STEVEN L. WiNTERt
I. No TURN ON RED
This school year, I am teaching in the city where I grew up. I
haven't lived here for seventeen years, but there is a welcome
familiarity to the streets, parks, and other landmarks of my
childhood and adolescence. One thing at least has changed rather
dramatically.1 The local drivers are more erratic and unpredictable
than when I first learned to drive these streets some twenty years
ago. The occasional left turn from a right lane is disconcerting
enough. But, far worse, the local drivers seem to treat a red light
as a kind of advisory opinion from the traffic department. Even
though I learned a few things about erratic driving during four years
in Miami, I have had to make some adjustments to get around
without mishaps.
My route to and from the law school takes me down the city's
main street. On my way home one evening, I stopped for a red
light at a familiar spot about one hundred feet from the street
where one of my grade school classmates used to live. While I
waited for the light to change, I noticed that the cable which
supports the light also supports a sign that reads "No Turn on Red."
This is not unusual in itself. There are many such signs on street
corners all over the city. Many are at intersections where there are
likely to be children nearby, and this particular intersection is near
a housing project.
But there is one thing truly odd about this sign: It is posted at
a three-way intersection where the only side street is a one way
street that enters from the left. Two rather conspicuous "Do Not
* © Copyright 1991, Steven L. Winter.
t Professor, University of Miami School of Law; Visiting Professor, Yale Law
School. I am indebted to Lynn Winter who not only helped with the research, but
also helped shape the way in which I have come to understand these issues. My
thanks also to Bruce Ackerman, Owen Fiss, Mark Johnson, Tony Kronman, Frank
Michelman, Jeremy Paul, Pierre Schlag, and the participants in the legal theory
workshops at the Duke and University of Toronto Law Schools.
1 Well, actually, some other things have changed, too. The city is more scarred
by poverty, drugs, and violence. See Finnegan, A Reporter at Large: Out There.I, NEw
YORKER, Sept. 10, 1990, at 51. But, then, my argument will be that these phenomena
are very much related.
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Enter" signs are posted on that corner. The closest right turn is
almost one hundred feet past the light, into the street where my
classmate once lived. While I waited for the light to change, I
marvelled at this "No Turn on Red" sign. What possibly could have
led the traffic department to place it there? Had drivers been
making a left turn on red, heading the wrong way down the entering
one way street? Or had they been going through the red light,
proceeding the hundred feet to the next corner, and then turning
right? And if they had been doing either of those things, was it
remotely plausible that one more sign proclaiming "No Turn on
Red" would have any effect whatsoever on their (mis)behavior?
I don't want you to think that such exercises in legal futility are
a particular peccadillo of my hometown. My wife and I watched an
analogous set of developments when we were living in Miami.
Florida law prohibits the carrying of a concealed weapon without a
license. Prior to 1987, licensing was left to the individual counties
pursuant to minimum standards set out in the state statute.2
Under this regime, the two large urban counties in the southern
portion of the state-Dade (which includes Miami) and Broward
(which includes Fort Lauderdale)-had relatively restrictive gun
licensing ordinances. The more rural counties to the north had
relatively lax provisions. In 1987, the state legislature amended the
law to provide for a state-wide licensing system to be administered
by the Florida Department of State under more detailed standards
spelled out in the statute. 3 The net effect of the change was to
tighten restrictions in the northern, rural counties but substantially
to liberalize those in the southern, urban counties. As a result,
many more Dade and Broward residents were able quickly to obtain
handguns. We watched nightly as the local news programs showed
scene after scene of the long lines and packed houses at local gun
stores and target practice ranges.
What followed was entirely predictable. As the number of guns
in Florida households increased, so did the incidents in which small
children found mommy's or daddy's gun and accidentally shot
themselves, their siblings, or their playmates. 4 Despite the grim
statistics, the number of handguns continued to increase. By the
2 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.05-.06 (West 1976).
3 See id. § 790.06 (West Supp. 1990).
4 See, e.g., Fatal Shootings of YoungPeople on the Rise in Florida, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10,
1988, at All, col. 1 (reporting 37 fatal shootings of children in Dade county in the
first three quarters of 1988, compared to 24 in all of 1987).
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summer of 1989, The New York Times reported that "60 percent of
[Florida] households have at least one gun, a rate that is tied with
that in Texas as the highest in the country."5 Then, in a barrage of
national news coverage, the inevitable denouement: In a two week
period, five children were injured or killed with their parents'
guns.6 There was intense pressure to do something. After first
opposing any change in the gun laws, the governor reversed
position and called the legislature into special session. The
legislature promptly found
that a tragically large number of Florida children have been
accidentally killed or seriously injured by negligently stored
firearms; that placing firearms within the reach or easy access of
children is irresponsible, encourages such accidents, and should be
prohibited; and that legislative action is necessary to protect the
safety of our children.7
It acted accordingly, mandating safe storage of all loaded firearms
to which a minor might gain access.8 To make sure that parents
would be aware of their responsibility not to leave a loaded gun
where a child might find it, the legislature required retailers to post
and deliver written warnings to the purchasers of all guns. 9 Failure
to comply with the storage requirements was made a second degree
misdemeanor punishable by sixty days imprisonment and a $500
fine.10 But this provision has a catch, for it applies only if a minor
actually gains access to a weapon and, without supervision, handles
it "[i]n a public place.., or [i]n a rude, careless, angry, or threaten-
ing manner."1 As a practical matter, this proviso means that the
authorities are unlikely to discover and prosecute a violation except
when a child is actually injured or killed.
Now, I am not fortunate enough to be a parent yet. Neverthe-
less, it strikes me that, as a deterrent, sixty days and $500 pales in
comparison to the prospect that one's child might be injured or
5 Schmalz, Children Shooting Children: Move is on for Gun Control, N.Y. TimesJune
18, 1989, § 1, at 20, col. 5.
6 See id.
7 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.173(1) (West Supp. 1990).
8 See id. § 790.174(1).
9 See id. § 790.175(1)-(2). The warning reads: "IT IS UNLAWFUL, AND
PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISONMENT AND FINE, FOR ANY ADULT TO STORE OR
LEAVE A FIREARM IN ANY PLACE WITHIN THE REACH OR EASY ACCESS OF
A MINOR." Id. § 790.175(1).
10 See id. §§ 790.174(2), 775.082(4), 775.083(1)(e).
11 Id. § 790.174(2).
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killed by a handgun-let alone one's own. I recognize, of course,
that parents don't expect their children to find their guns; and they
certainly don't envision their children shooting themselves, their
siblings, or their playmates. But, by the very same token, they
cannot therefore expect that they will be charged, convicted, and
sentenced under the statute: In order for there to be a violation
under the provision, a child must in fact find the gun. Thus,
parents who do not have the foresight to anticipate the danger to
their children could not possibly be deterred by the statute. And,
conversely, parents with the insight to recognize that they could be
liable for the statutory penalty of two months in jail already will be
deterred by the prospect that their children might be injured or
killed. What, then, does this law accomplish?12
In its own way, each of these examples typifies the predicament
of contemporary normativity. To the degree that these particular
cases seem exaggerated, they only cast in bas-relief the fundamental
problems that limit and afflict all forms of normative practice. I
examine these problems under the general rubric of "community."
My claim is that both the success and the very coherence of
normative practice are contingent upon community. But the
concept of "community" that I will employ in this argument is not
the conventional one that understands community primarily as a
matter of political organization, geographic location, or consciously
shared creed. Rather, my claim is that the social phenomena that
correspond with each of these more conventional understandings
are themselves possible only because community is first and
foremost a cognitive phenomenon. In this view, what is referred to
as a community is a group identification (whether partial or
complete, self-conscious or not) that is a function or end product of
common ways of understanding and living in a world. To put it
another way, "community" is the name we give to a group of people
12 It may be that the statute accomplishes some non-regulatory purposes, as I will
discuss shortly.
An intelligently drawn regulatory statute could have made criminal the negligent
storage of a firearm per se-that is, without regard to whether a child actually gains
access to the weapon. But that would have required some effective investigatory and
enforcement mechanisms. The Florida legislature, however, was emphatic about its
distaste for that option. In its specification of legislative findings and intent, it stated:
"Nothing in this act shall be construed to reduce or limit any existing right to
purchase and own firearms, or to provide authority to any state or local agency to
infringe upon the privacy of any family, home, or business, except by lawful warrant."
Id. § 790.173(2).
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who share a paradigm,1 3 a nomos,14 a culture,15 or a world-
view.
1 6
In large part, my argument will consist in the development and
explication of just what I mean by this notion of community as a
cognitive phenomenon. My premise, however, is that the internal
determinants of community-and, thus, of all forms of normative
practice-must be understood in terms of the cognitive processes of
internalization and imagination. We can begin the analysis by
examining the traffic sign and gun control anecdotes to see what
they reveal about the role that these two processes play in the law's
effort to regulate behavior.
The anecdote about the traffic sign illustrates the importance of
internalization to the effective operation of law: The traffic sign will
work only to the extent that drivers have already developed a habit
of conformity with the rules of the road or internalized an ethic of
compliance with legal directives.17  This is yet more clear in the
13 See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUIrONS 11 (2d ed. 1970);
Kuhn, Second Thoughts on Paradigms, in THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 459,
460 (F. Suppe ed. 1974) ("A paradigm is what the members of a scientific community,
and they alone, share. Conversely, it is their possession of a common paradigm that
constitutes a scientific community of a group of otherwise disparate men.").
14 See Cover, The Supreme Court; 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-6 (1983).
15 See Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes
for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1134-36 (1989).16 See N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 2-5 (1978).
17 Although habitualization of this kind must be understood as part of a process
of socialization, it would be a mistake to see it solely as a matter of conscious
normative instruction and deliberate rule following. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN,
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
KNOWLEDGE 53-55 (1967). Rather, a critical-if not more important-part of the
process comes from the experience of repeated compliance itself. "Any action that
is repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can then be reproduced
with an economy of effort and which, ipsofacto, is apprehended by its performer as
that pattern." Id. at 53. In a case like that of driving, habitualization necessarily takes
place in a social context that is highly structured and, so, habitualization and
socialization are one and the same. See id. at 54 ("Empirically, the more important
part of the habitualization of human activity is coextensive with the latter's
institutionalization."). "Institutionalization" is the name that Berger and Luckmann
give to this complementary process by which the individual internalizes a habit of
behavior that is socially structured.
It is important to stress that this controlling character is inherent in
institutionalization as such, prior to or apart from any mechanisms of
sanctions specifically set up to support an institution. These mechanisms
* , do, of course, exist in many institutions and in all the agglomerations
of institutions that we call societies. Their controlling efficacy, however, is
of a secondary or supplementary kind. As we shall see again later, the
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reverse case of a driver who stops at a red light on a deserted street
at 3:00 a.m. despite the fact that the sightlines are clear, there is no
cross- or oncoming traffic, and there are no police (or other
witnesses) around. Why would she do so when she knows she can
run the light with impunity and reach her destination more quickly?
By definition, deterrence is not a factor. Yet many of us do wait for
that light because we have so thoroughly internalized the rules of
the road that it is almost more trouble to act against the grain than
it is to wait.
We can further test the point about the role of these internal,
cognitive determinants by considering the Holmesian "bad man"1 8
who stops at the light only because of the deterrent effect of a
potential legal sanction. In that case, it appears rather obvious that
the law is an external factor. Yet, even here, compliance is in an
important sense an internal event for it depends upon an act of
imagination. In order for -deterrence to operate, our hypothetical
"bad man" must be able to project the possibility of detection and
the ensuing prospect of sanction. Otherwise, even the risk averse
"bad man" would stop only when forced to by traffic conditions or
the presence of an officer.
The gun control anecdote illustrates in another way the
importance of adequate internalization and imagination to the
success and coherence of the normative enterprise. Here, the
requirements of the statute not only coincide with the ordinary
requisites of the parental role but, in a crucial sense, depend upon
the ability of particular parents effectively to fulfill that role: that
is, to exercise their imaginative capacities to project a potential
course of events and anticipate the possibility of danger to their
children.19 Without these internal preconditions, no amount of
legal legerdemain will work..
It may be objected that these anecdotes merely illustrate
conventional wisdom about the limits of the legal sanction-that is,
the practical limitations on enforcement that make criminalization
ineffective in the face of widespread noncompliance. In the same
vein, one might also question whether these anecdotes are really
primary social control is given in the existence of an institution as such.
Id. at 55.
18 See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
19 Cf. Cover, supra note 14, at 5 ("[N]or can prescription, even when embodied in
a legal text, escape its origin and its end in experience, in the narratives that are the
trajectories plotted upon material reality by our imaginations.").
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examples of normative practice. Or, to be analytically more precise,
one might draw a distinction between prescriptive and persuasive
normativity. It might then be argued that the limitations which
undermine attempts to prescribe norms for behavior in society, as
exemplified by these anecdotes, are not applicable to efforts openly
to persuade others to accept those same norms, as exemplified by
the genre of legal scholarship that is the subject of this symposium.
The full argument would be rather straightforward: Because
prescriptive normative practice attempts to constrain or act on the
will of another, its effectiveness is limited by the will of the legal
subject and her capacity to evade or resist compliance. Accordingly,
the success of prescription is a function of either: (1) the favorable
predisposition of the legal subject; or (2) the meaningful threat of
the coercive power of the State. Persuasive normative practice, on
the other hand, is by definition a noncoercive effort to engage with
another to induce her willingly to arrive at and adopt a particular
normative standard. In that case, all that is really needed is a clear
playing field-something like a Habermasian ideal speech situation.
The ultimate aim of this essay is to demonstrate that prescriptive
and persuasive normativity are necessarily dependent upon exactly
the same preconditions. As a preliminary matter, however, one
should consider how quickly the prescriptive/persuasive distinction
collapses under examination. Every prescription, even "No Turn on
Red," has a hortatory character; indeed, for the person who has
internalized an ethic of compliance with legal directives, it is an
exhortation entirely sufficient to persuade that person to behave in
a certain manner regardless of the advantages of noncompliance
(like getting home more quickly). For the driver who runs the light
and disobeys the sign, its injunction is as much an effort at
persuasion as prescription. Indeed, the more cavalier the driver,
the more blithely the driver disregards the relevant traffic laws, the
more it will be the case that the sign can be understood only as a
last ditch attempt at persuasion. How else can we interpret the "No
Turn on Red" sign in the opening anecdote?
In the gun control anecdote, prescription is transmuted into
persuasion in two different ways. First, the statute can be under-
stood as emphasizing the gravity of the problem and, thus, as an
exhortation to parents to take greater care. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, the statute spells out for the thoughtless the
predictable relationship between the negligent storage of handguns
and the risk of ensuing accidents. In making this connection public,
the statute takes the place of the deficient imaginative capacities of
1991]
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those parents who do not otherwise anticipate the possibility of
danger to their children. But, for those parents who care about
their children, the work of persuasion is already accomplished once
the statute supplies that link.
The distinction between prescriptive and persuasive normativity
is no more stable when examined from the other side. Persuasive
normativity cannot be understood apart from its prescriptive
dimensions; in an important sense, every act of persuasion has its
origin and end in prescription. This is self-evidently true of
normative legal scholarship. At the outset, it must take certain
forms if it is to be recognized as legal rather than purely political
and as scholarship rather than mere advocacy. Its yield, moreover,
is explicitly prescriptive. The very point is to persuade the reader
that a particular prescription should be adopted-whether it be the
author's proposed three-part test, theory of interpretation, or
recommended approach to legal theory.
But this dependence upon prescription is no less real for the
more ambitious, democratic versions of persuasive normativity.
Every effort at normative persuasion, by necessary implication,
presupposes that there is divergence amongst the initial normative
positions. Except in the rarefied realm of pure theory, even the
most utopian normative aspirations must take into account the
possibility of imperfect agreement. It follows, therefore, that
persuasive normativity is utterly dependent upon prescription. For,
in the face of imperfect agreement, all efforts at persuasion must
conclude in prescription. Moreover, if those prescriptions are to
derive their legitimacy from the persuasive (rather than coercive)
nature of the decisionmaking process, then that process must itself
be premised on some prescription that specifies in advance the
conditions under which dialogue will count as persuasion rather
than coercion. 20
This deconstruction of the distinction between prescription and
persuasion is more than a clever rhetorical ploy. It sets the stage
for my argument that all forms of normativity-both prescriptive and
persuasive-are unavoidably contingent on community. But it does
20 Of course, this prescription itself may be the product of deliberation; there is
no necessary logical or temporal sequence to this process of prescription/persuasion.
But, if there is less than perfect agreement during the deliberative part of the process,
there necessarily will be a purely prescriptive dimension to the ensuing ground rules.
Only unanimity can save persuasive normativity from infinite regress; even then, one
subsequent dissenter will destroy the consensual dimension of the process.
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more than that, for the last point, concerning the prescriptive
procedural conditions for persuasion, also encapsulates the
argument in its broadest form. Consider, for example, Frank
Michelman's candid description of the necessary preconditions for
the form of normative persuasion he calls "republicanjurisgenesis":
Given plurality, a political process can validate a societal norm as
self-given law only if (i) participation in the process results in some
shift or adjustment in relevant understandings on the parts of
some (or all) participants, and (ii) there exists a set of prescriptive
social and procedural conditions such that one's undergoing,
under those conditions, such a dialogic modulation of one's
understandings is not considered or experienced as coercive, or
invasive, or otherwise a violation of one's identity or freedom
21
On the first reading, statement (ii) is an explicit acknowledgement
that republican persuasion is dependent on the existence of
prescriptive preconditions. But a closer reading of the passage
indicates that persuasion entails "community" in the very sense that
I have employed it. For it is only within a community of shared
understandings that one could experience as noncoercive, non-
invasive, and respectful of one's freedom, a process in which one is
the object of dialogic modulation by others.2 2 It is only when all
the participants have internalized the same set of prescriptions as
constituting a dialogue (and not, say, a diatribe or harangue) that
undergoing dialogic modulation by others would be experienced as
persuasion and not prescription.
But there is more to my argument, to which we now turn.
II. LOCATING COMMUNITY IN THE SELF
In one sense, the argument so far may seem exactly backward.
Ordinarily, law (i.e., normative prescription) is understood to
comprehend the coercive threat of state violence. What distinguish-
es the claim of dialogue (i.e., normative persuasion) is that it offers
a legitimate, noncoercive means for achieving social order. In other
words, prescription (law in a strong sense) is what we rely on when
there is no community. The aspiration of persuasive normativity,
on the other hand, is to establish a community-indeed one that is
21 Michelman, Law's Republic 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1526-27 (1988).
22 In Michelman's words, it is a process of "one's undergoing, under those
conditions, such a dialogic modulation of one's understandings .... " Id. at 1527.
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free and self-governing. 'Yet, paradoxically, I have claimed that
community is a prerequisite to the success of prescription and,
tautologically, that community is a necessary precondition even for
the effort to establish community through dialogue.
It might seem that I have created this conundrum by adopting
an idiosyncratic definition of community. But I don't think so, as
I try to show below. In the subsections that follow, I examine a
recent argument that opposes the coercive nature of law to the very
concept of community. I then show that the conception of the self
upon which this concept of community is based cannot accommo-
date a wide range of the social phenomena it purports to describe.
In the final subsection, I expand upon those phenomena to proyide
a more meaningful account that locates community in the processes
of the self.
A. Community and the Concept of Role
In an essay entitled Law, Community, and Communication, Meir
Dan-Cohen argues that law is better understood as a form of
strategic communication issuing from the bureaucratic organization
known as the State. 23 He explicitly contrasts this vision of law with
Ronald Dworkin's idea of law as interpretation which, he suggests,
is closely related to Habermas's distinction between "communicative
action" and "strategic communication": "In communicative action,
the participants are oriented toward reaching agreement through
understanding. In strategic communication, by contrast, partici-
pants are oriented toward success; they have a specific goal
determined antecedently to their discursive behavior that the latter
is designed to promote." 24 Like communicative action, Dworkin's
"interpretation takes place in the context of community" under
ideal conditions that "secure a degree of cognitive alignment and
23 See Dan-Cohen, Law, Community, and Communication, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1654,
1669-71. Professor Dan-Cohen acknowledges that there are aspects of the State and
of legal interpretation that correspond to notions of community, but stresses that
"short of utopia, we must contend with both poles." Id. at 1676. His emphasis on
strategic communication and bureaucratic organization "is purely reactive, to right
an imbalance in present dayjurisprudence that Dworkin's theory mainly creates." Id.
at 1675. Because I am much less interested in his account of adjudication than in his
concept of community, I consider the argument at face value even though it is
explicitly offered as only a partial account. But, by the close of this essay, it should
be clear why the distinction between communicative action and strategic communica-
tion-and the identification of adjudication with the latter--cannot be maintained.
24 Id. at 1660.
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motivational coordination among the participants .... .25 The
Dworkinianjudge in effect engages in a dialogue with his predeces-
sors, and this dialogue presumes that the participants share the
ambition to be a community of principle whose decisions can be
rendered coherent in terms of "the consistency of principle [that]
integrity requires."26
In contrast, Dan-Cohen claims that legal argument and judicial
decisionmaking more strongly resemble strategic communication
than communitarian efforts at reaching agreement through
understanding. The fulcrum of his argument is the concept of role-
distance, which he borrows from the sociologist Erving Goffman.
"IT]he concept of role-distance... relates to the self's capacity to
locate itself, metaphorically speaking, at variable distances from the
different roles it occupies."2 7
Some roles are relatively central to and even identified with
one's sense of self. These are non-detached roles which the self
enacts "transparently" in the sense that its "will is identical (within
the role's domain) with the role's requirements. There is therefore
no question of providing... [it] with some 'external' motivation to
perform the various aspects of... [the] role . ... "28 There are
other roles, however, in which the self experiences substantial role-
distance. These detached roles are characterized by self-conscious-
ness in their performance, the awareness that the self is play-acting
or just conforming to social requirements and expectations. 29 As
25Id. at 1661.
26 R. DWoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228 (1986). Dworkin continues:
Law as integrity asks judges to assume, so far as this is possible, that law is
structured by a coherent set of principles about justice and fairness and
procedural due process, and it asks them to enforce these in the fresh cases
that come before them .... That style of adjudication respects the ambition
integrity assumes, the ambition to be a community of principle.
Id. at 243.
7 Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 1654-55 (discussing E. GOFFMAN, Role Distance,
in ENCOUNTERS: Two STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERACTION 85 (1961)).2 8 Id. at 1656-57.
29 See id. at 1655; see also Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the
Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1563, 1569 (1984) ("[S]he and I both
know, whether consciously or not, that she is not being herselfbut rather an ineffable
'someone else'-a 'bank teller.' ... [Tihe as-if performances ... are makeshift
phantoms that lack any ground, straining in 'mid-air,' you might say, to deny the
other access to the withdrawn someone who we really are."). Dan-Cohen recognizes,
however, that degrees of detachment are not inherent properties of roles and that,
for a given role, role-distance can fluctuate over time. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 23,
at 1655.
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a consequence, the requirements of detached roles do not become
the self's own. Detached roles, therefore, present "starkly the
problems of motivation, autonomy, and coercion.
" 3 °
Dan-Cohen uses this concept of role-distance to distinguish
between two forms of social affiliation and their attendant modes of
communication. A community, the paradigm for which is the ideal
family, is a collectivity of non-detached roles. A bureaucratic
organization, exemplified by a large corporation like AT&T, is a
social union of detached roles that allow or even call for dis-
tance.3 1 Each of these forms of association is in turn identified
with a particular mode of communication. Because a community is
constituted by the intersection of non-detached roles, the resulting
"cognitive alignment and motivational coordination"3 2 allows for
interpretation, persuasion, and potential agreement through
understanding. On the other hand, because a bureaucratic
organization is essentially a loose association of detached roles, the
resulting distance and motivational dissonance will require strategic
communication oriented toward achieving the organization's
preexisting goals.
The primacy of strategic forms of communication within
organizations is related to the fact that bureaucratic rationality is
preeminently instrumentalist rationality.
[T]he organization is characteristically engaged in a competitive
struggle for scarce resources to put to the service of its predeter-
mined ends. It is therefore a central responsibility of managers to
direct and redirect their organizations' available resources, both
human and non-human, as effectively as possible toward those
ends.... Bureaucratic rationality is the rationality of matching
means to ends economically and efficiently.
3 3
Thus, Dan-Cohen suggests that the role-distance which characterizes
a bureaucracy may be peculiarly adapted to facilitate its strategic
goals. On one hand, it aids the organization: Detached roles can
be more efficiently managed, interchanged and, if necessary,
eliminated. On the other hand, role-distance protects the individu-
al: "[B]y isolating the self from the organizational role, role-
s0 Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 1657.
31 See id. at 1659.
32 Id. at 1661.
33 A. MAcINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MoRAL THEORY 25 (2d ed. 1984).
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distance shields the self to a degree from the blatant instrumenta-
lism of these organizations."3 4
With this analytic framework in place, Dan-Cohen assesses the
nature of adjudication. Legal discourse, he explains, is primarily
strategic. The legal arguments and courtroom tactics of the
advocate are designed not so much to achieve agreement through
understanding as they are oriented strategically to achieve success
for the client. Accordingly, the role of the advocate is best
understood in terms of role-distance. "Lawyers routinely say, and
indeed are expected to say, things they are not supposed to
believe."35 In this mode, the advocate operates as part of an
organization-a municipal legal system under the auspices of the
State-that consists in the interaction of these detached roles.36
Much the same is true if one considers adjudication from the
perspective of the judge. Her opinions are designed strategically
"to secure compliance, not to generate agreement . . ."3 Al-
though the judicial opinion can be characterized as an effort to
persuade the parties to comply, it also serves as the prescriptive
warrant for an enforcement bureaucracy.38 Thus, the judicial role
must be a detached one, for the judge too will need to be shielded
from the blatant instrumentalism of her role.3 9 It follows from this
conclusion that the institution of adjudication is basically a
bureaucratic rather than communal form. "It is an avowed purpose
of this social structure to secure order and promote cooperation, if
need be by force, in the face of recalcitrance, moral diversity, and
disagreement."4 °
s Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 1659.
I51d. at 1666.
36 See id. at 1669.
37 Id. at 1672.
3s See id. at 1673 ("Judicial utterances are supposed to secure certain forms of
conduct .... These utterances are therefore success-rather than truth-oriented
39 The theory of cognitive dissonance, however, would suggest that just the
opposite will be the case: The more blatantly instrumental thejudge's role, the more
she needs to be shielded from the implications of what she does, the more likely it
is that thejudge will be convinced that her actions and conclusions are necessary and
objective. In other words, the more coercive and distasteful the role, the greater will
be the need to achieve a cognitive alignment between the demands of the role and
a flattering conception of "self." Cf Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 296,
325 (1990) ("Taking moral responsibility for deciding indeterminate cases is
unpleasant, givingjudges a reason not to notice how often they make rather than
follow law."); id. at 329-30 (noting that "they need to maintain their self-esteem, which
is dependent on internalized norms that are in part socially created").
4°Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 1675 (citing Cover, supra note 14; Cover, Violence
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As I have rehearsed the argument so far, it is a sophisticated
account of the conventional understanding that opposes the
coercive prescription of law to the community-building of persuasive
normativity. 41 It provides, moreover, a fully articulated, theoreti-
cal conception of community that is antithetical to the claim that
both forms of normativity are contingent upon community. Thus,
the argument would seem to substantiate the suggestion made above
that this supposed contingency is the product of an unusual and
mistaken definition of community. It does not, however, and the
reason is twofold: First, ]Dan-Cohen's theoretical conception of
community cannot be sustained; and, second, its shortcomings lead
directly to a conception of community as, first and foremost, a
cognitive phenomenon.
B. A Role, By Any Other Name...
The problem with Dan-Cohen's account inheres in his central
conception-the idea of role-distance. Early in his essay, Dan-Cohen
provides two illustrations that are explicitly intended to obtain the
reader's assent to his concept of role-distance. First, he asks the
reader to consider the role of parent. "Since there is no distance
between me and my role as a father, since I fully identify with that
role, the imperatives that guide me in discharging it are in an
important sense internal to me." 42 As a consequence, the father
needs no "'external' motivation to perform the various aspects of
my parental role-for example, to get up to my crying baby--since an
'internal' motivation is already provided in the assumption that I
enact parenthood as a non-detached role."43 When a person is
acting within the domain of a non-detached role, coercive prescrip-
tion is entirely out of place. Rather, it becomes necessary only
"when a gap has been opened between the person and his or her
role as parent .... "44
and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601 (1.986)).
41 If the argument falls short, it would seem to be a consequence of the self-
conscious choice to emphasize one half of an admittedly more complex dynamic. See
Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 1665-75. For a discussion of how the coercive,
communal, and transformative dimensions of law are all entailed in our basic
conception of law and legal rights, see Winter, supra note 15, at 1207-34.
42 Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 1656.
" Id. at 1657. Note that the terms "internal" and "external" are in quotes. I shall
return to the significance of these quotes in the discussion below. See infra text
accompanying notes 61-67.
4Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 1657.
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To this idyllic picture of parenthood, Dan-Cohen juxtaposes the
organizational role of a telephone operator at AT&T. All that is
required of the operator is that he or she go through the motions
of the role with adequate proficiency. As an operator, one is
entirely free to
keep the role at a distance-outside of me-the role's requirements
do not, in and of themselves, become my reasons or motivations
for complying with them. The various tasks that compose the
telephone operator's role, such as answering the numerous phone
calls and operating the electronic switchboard, are not the things
the operator himself has any reason or desire to do. (The crucial
point here is that it makes perfectly good sense to refer to the
operator himself, meaning the operator qua person, aside from
this particular role. By contrast, it ordinarily would be clumsy to
separate a person from, say, the parent that he is.) 45
Thus, an AT&T operator enacts a detached role that is part of a
bureaucratic organization. "For this reason, he in principle must be
bribed or coerced if he is to perform the role's requirements."4 6
This demonstration has more than surface plausibility.
Nevertheless, it is already in trouble before the first illustration is
completed, for it presupposes an entire set of assumptions that will
not stand a minute's scrutiny.
Dan-Cohen wants to persuade us to accept not only his
distinction between detached and non-detached roles, but also his
further point that coercion and strategic communication (i.e., the
prescriptive side of normative practice) are appropriate only when
a person enacts a detached role or suffers from alienation and
enacts a non-detached role in a detached manner.47 His primary
illustration is the parental role, where coercion is beside the point
because the motivation properly to perform the role is already
internal.
But one should consider again all those parents in Florida who
left loaded handguns where their children might find them. It is
clear that these parents were in dire need of some motivational
supplement if they were properly to perform their roles as parents.
Yet it does not seem likely that, in each and every case, these
parents were suffering alienation from their parental role. Quite
45 Id.46 Id. at 1658.
47 For Dan-Cohen, "alienation is an inappropriate role-distance-i.e., it is distance
from what is supposed to be one's communal role." Id. at 1659.
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the contrary, it is safe to assume that some (if not most) of these
parents were every bit as devoted to their children as you or I might
be. Indeed, it is likely that many of these parents actually purchased
guns as an entirely genuine exercise of their non-detached parental
roles-that is, a felt responsibility to protect their families and
homes.
48
Dan-Cohen's parental role illustration seems to make his point
only because he has chosen an example that is calculated to
resonate with the particular audience whose assent he is trying to
obtain. Since this audience consists of educated, middle class
readers thoroughly acculturated to mainstream values-people like
you and me-he is quite safe in presuming that we will share a
common set of assumptions about the details of the parental role
and what is required when the baby cries. Thus, when he asserts
that the parent's motivation for soothing the baby "is already
provided in the assumption that I enact parenthood as a non-detached
role,"49 he is in fact correct: We do already share the same set of
assumptions about the parental role, its importance, and its
authenticity in our lives; he has only to invoke it and name it. Like
every instance of persuasive normativity, this argument works
because it takes place within a community consisting of those who
already share a particular way of understanding and living in the
social world.
We can further test the point by considering Dan-Cohen's
parental illustration in light of two counterexamples: one in the
context of persuasive normative practice and the other in the
context of prescription. You will note that Dan-Cohen has the
father, as a self-motivated performance of his parental role, getting
up in the middle of the night to soothe the crying baby. Now
imagine a normative dialogue in which you are trying to persuade
a different father that he should do the same. Only this father is
your grandfather or a contemporary father who is part of a still
rigidly patriarchal culture in another part of the world-let's say
48 1 argued above that, as a means for motivating parents properly to perform
their parental role, this is a very silly statute. See supra text accompanying note 12.
But it is not silly for the reason suggested by Dan-Cohen. In his analytic scheme,
parenthood is a non-detached role and, as such, is one for which coercion and other
forms of "external" motivation are simply out of place. It would follow from this
reasoning that, since driving a car is a relatively detached role, coercive prescription
should be entirely appropriate in that context. Yet, if anything, the "No Turn on
Red" sign was even sillier than the: gun storage statute.
4' Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 1657 (emphasis added).
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Saudi Arabia. The first thing we notice about this situation is that
the claim that a father who is non-detached from his parental role
will have an "internal motivation" to get up to soothe his crying
baby has suddenly become false: It's a safe bet both that your
grandmother was the one to get up when your mom or dad cried
and that the Sheik never does. Moreover, the cultural contingency
of these gender-based parental roles has tremendously complicated
your task of persuasion. If you say to granddad or the Sheik "Now
it's your job as father to get up and soothe that baby," you are likely
to get that look of incomprehension that also says "this person is
crazy." And if you try to engage him with arguments of fairness and
equality, he is likely to point out: (1) that he is the breadwinner and
sole supporter of the family and needs his sleep; (2) that babies
respond better to maternal comfort and, after all, mothers are
better at nurturance; or (3) that it would be unmanly and would
subject him to dishonor.
When all efforts at persuasion had failed, you might then be
tempted to fall back on prescription. But note that this prescriptive
effort would be the consequence of the fact that these fathers refuse
to enact anything but their non-detached roles (as they understand
them). Consider, moreover, another kind of parent, the kind who
responds to the crying baby with anger, frustration, and physical
abuse. Here, we might all agree, is a classic case for coercive
prescription: Notwithstanding our best efforts at corrective
persuasion, there is a helpless infant that must be protected. But if
some measure of coercion makes sense in this context, it is not
because "a gap has been opened between the person and his or her
role as parent."50 The abusive parent is not acting out a detached
role. Rather, this person does not share-and, therefore, does not
have the capacity to enact-our conception of the parental role.51
50 Id.
5' For a psychoanalytic explanation of this phenomenon, see A. MILLER, THOU
SHALT NOT BE AwARE: SOCIETY'S BETRAYAL OF THE CHILD (1984):
The consequences of sexual abuse, however, are not restricted to
problems in one's sexual life; they impair the development of the self and
of an autonomous personality. There are several reasons why this is so: ...
[T]he fact of abuse must be repressed for the sake of survival .... The
consequences of a trauma are not eliminated by repressing it but are
actually reinforced. The inability to remember the trauma, to articulate it
... creates the need to articulate it in the repetition compulsion.
The unremembered plight of being at someone else's mercy and being
abused by a loved object is perpetuated either in a passive or active role, or
alternatively in each....
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The tragedy of child abuse is that so many abusive parents were
themselves products of abusive families. 52 The problem is not that
the abusive parent is detached from the parental role, but rather
that he or she may be all too much attached to a twisted version of
that role.
The example of the AT&T operator as enacting a detached role
in a bureaucratic organization seems to work better, but only
because it too is chosen to fit. In fact, Dan-Cohen acknowledges
immediately that a bureaucratic organization may contain upper
echelon management positions that are enacted as non-detached
roles. He recognizes that this would make AT&T a hybrid entity (a
bureaucratic community, perhaps?), but deflects the point by
observing that: "Putting aside the historical question of how AT&T
came to be, the organization presently can consist entirely of
detached roles .... "3 The fact that it happens to have some non-
detached roles is for Dan-Cohen a conceptual accident, an unneces-
sary condition that can nevertheless be accommodated within the
organization.
54
The point, however, cannot be deflected because Dan-Cohen's
basic premise is in trouble both as a descriptive and conceptual
matter. It is in trouble as a descriptive matter because we know that
the CEO of AT&T not only eats, sleeps, and breathes his role, but
also that this is how he got to be CEO. We are all familiar with the
concept of "a team player," "the company man," or "the man in the
grey flannel suit." No one rises in a bureaucracy unless she makes
it her own (and, simultaneously, it makes her its own). The efficient
manager is one who can direct the organization's human resources
with total commitment and single-mindedness, free of the compro-
One of the simplest and completely unnoticed forms of perpetuation
of the active role is abuse of o"e's children for one's own needs, which are all
the more urgent and uncontrollable the more deeply repressed the original
trauma.
Id. at 162-63.5 2 See M. STRAus, R. GELLES & S. STEINMETZ, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE
IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 97-122 (1980); id. at 121 ("We traced this learning process
through three generations. The more violent the grandparents, the more violent the
couples in our study are as husbands and wives, and the more abusive they are to
their children."). It is important, however, to recognize that there is only a
correlation between experience in one's family of origin and abusive behavior as an
adult and not a direct and invariant causal relationship. See id. at 122.
" Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 1658.
54 See id. ("Although it is not required that some of AT&T's roles be non-
detached, however, there would be no contradiction in terms of my proposed scheme
if, in fact, some role were to be enacted so.").
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mise, doubt, and cynicism that infect the enactment of a detached
role.5 5 To the observation that "[b]ureaucratic rationality is the
rationality of matching means to ends economically and efficient-
ly," 56 one might add "and do so without guilt."
It is in trouble as a conceptual matter because, far from an
accidental element of a corporate bureaucracy, the non-detached
role of manager may be a quintessential element of modern culture.
That, at least, is Alasdair MacIntyre's claim. In contrast to Dan-
Cohen's distinction between detached and non-detached roles,
MacIntyre introduces a distinction between a social role and a
"character"-for which his contemporary paradigm is the bureaucrat-
ic manager.57 What makes a character distinct from an ordinary
role is the way in which it functions as a central reference point and
determinant both for the person and the society:
There is a type of dramatic tradition-Japanese Noh plays and
English medieval morality plays are examples-which possess a set
of stock characters immediately recognizable to the audience.
Such characters partially define the possibilities of plot and action.
To understand them is to be provided with a means of interpreting
the behavior of the actors who play them, just because a similar
understanding informs the intentions of the actors themselves; and
other actors may define their parts with special reference to these
central characters. So it is also with certain kinds of social role
specific to certain particular cultures. They furnish recognizable
characters and the ability to recognize them is socially crucial
because a knowledge of the character provides an interpretation
of the actions of those individuals who have assumed the charac-
ter. It does so precisely because those individuals have used the
very same knowledge to guide and to structure their behavior.58
55 For those of you who are viewers of the ABC television show thirysomething,
this is what Miles Drentell is forever trying to impress upon Michael Steadman.
M A. MACINTY.E, supra note 33, at 25.
57 See id. at 27-28. Madntyre also notes:
Characters ... must not be confused with social roles in general. For they
are a very special type of social role which places a certain kind of moral
constraint on the personality of those who inhabit them in a way in which
many other social roles do not .... Many modern occupational roles-that
of a dentist or that of a garbage collector, for example-are not characters in
the way that of the bureaucratic manager is .... In the case of a characteri,]
role and personality fuse in a more specific way than in general ....
Id.
58 Id. at 27.
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It is the centrality and culturally shared nature of the character of
the bureaucratic manager that makes plausible both Calvin
Coolidge's claim that "The business of America is business" and the
part of Miles Drentell on the ABC television show thirtysomething.59
I am not so much interested whether MacIntyre or Dan-Cohen
provides the better conceptual distinction. Indeed, I have similar
problems with both sets of distinctions precisely because they are
distinctions and, therefore, spatialize what is better understood as
a cognitive process. But I am intrigued by the fact that they both
choose the domain of bureaucratic organization and management
to exemplify their very different conceptions: Where, for Dan-
Cohen, a bureaucratic organization is defined by its detached roles,
for MacIntyre it is an institution that is definitionalfor its constitu-
ents and for society at large. Yet, each account seems to be true at
least in part. What this suggests is that there may be better ways to
understand the complexities of such intrapsychic phenomena.
Consider again the case of the telephone operator. True, this
is ordinarily not the kind of role upon which one builds a personal
identity. But it is not inconceivable. The comedienne Lili Tomlin
rose to fame in part on her characterization of Ernestine, the
telephone operator who is only too happy to let the customer know
that "we" won't put up with that, "we don't have to, we're the phone
company." Ernestine is not detached from her bureaucratic role; if
anything, she takes her role too seriously. Ernestine is of course
fiction, but the character works precisely because the audience
recognizes in her the overweening petty bureaucrat who, in real life,
does power-trip in just this way.
Dan-Cohen does have a normative response to this phenome-
non: He identifies it as a "disease" that, following Sartre, he calls
bad faith-that is, "misplaced identification with what ought to be a
distanced, organizational role."60 But surely this is too harsh.
Normally, we consider ourselves fortunate when we encounter
secretaries or other support staff who identify with their roles and
who pride themselves on their capacity to perform those roles with
efficiency and dispatch. The greater the identification, the more
they are self-motivated, the more fortunate we consider ourselves.
59 See supra note 55.
60 Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 1659 (citingJ.P. SARTRE, L'ETRE ET LE N9ANT 82
(1943)).
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Far from condemning these people for bad faith, we applaud them
for their sense of professionalism.
In sum, Dan-Cohen's concept of role-distance does not do the
work he requires of it because it cannot accommodate a wide range
of the social phenomena it purports to describe. The reason for
this is simple: The unarticulated premise upon which it is based is
a deeply flawed conception of the "self."
C. Separation Anxiety
The problems with Dan-Cohen's concept of role-distance have
everything to do with the way in which he spatializes it. Role-
distance "relates to the self's capacity to locate itself, metaphorically
speaking, at variable distances from the different roles that it
occupies."61 "The distance between a person and a role can shrink
or expand."62 "[A] gap has been opened between the person and his
or her role as parent."63 By necessary implication, this way of
spatializing the self and its roles entails a conception of the self as
separate from those roles. True, some roles are (to use Dan-
Cohen's phrase) worn more tightly than others. 64 But this meta-
phor too separates the "true" self from its temporary garb. The
concept of a role, moreover, is reified and treated as an object "out
there." This separation of the self from its roles is what leads Dan-
Cohen to define alienation and bad faith in the way that he does.
Alienation is when the self does not recognize that the role which
it is holding at arm's length should "really" be congruent with its
"true" self. Bad faith is when a role that should be maintained at
arm's length is instead misidentified as one's "own" self.
But if the self is separated from its roles in this way, then for
Dan-Cohen it must necessarily be empty of social substance. And,
indeed, it is: When this self fully "occupies" a role-that is, when it
assumes a role in a non-detached way-the self becomes coextensive
with that role and takes on its content. No "external" motivation is
then necessary because the motivation has been assumed along with
the non-detached role and, thus, has become "internal" to the
self.65 Conversely, when this empty self is detached from a role-
61 Id. at 1655 (emphasis added).
62 Id. (emphasis added).
63 Id. at 1657 (emphasis added).
64 See id. at 1655 ("It is also not the case that some roles must be worn tightly,
whereas others are kept at a distance by all their takers.").
65 See id. at 1657 (quoted supra text accompanying note 43).
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that is, when there is a "gap" between the self and the role-the
motivation of the role remains foreign to the self. "Insofar as the
role that I enact is a detached one, I experience the role's impera-
tives as external .... "66 Motivation becomes a "stark problem"
because the self has no necessary reason to comply with the role's
requirements.6 7
If, for Dan-Cohen, the self is substantively empty in this way, it
must nevertheless contain a residuum of pure will that is separate
from any motivationally complex role that it might assume.68 And
this is exactly how he does conceive it, for it is only if the self has
a will separate from its roles that he could refer to "the self's
capacity to locate itself" with respect to a particular role.69 And
this, in turn, implies radical freedom: "The democratized self which
has no necessary social content and no necessary social identity can
then be anything, can assume any role or take any point of view,
because it is in and for it;elf nothing."70  It is, moreover, this
conception of a radically autonomous self that unites the otherwise
disparate views of Goffman and Sartre which Dan-Cohen has
partially conjoined:
In Goffman's anecdotal descriptions of the social world there is
still discernable that ghostly 'I', the psychological peg to whom
Goffman denies substantial selthood, flitting evanescently from
one solidly role-structured situation to another; and for Sartre the
self's self-discovery is characterized as the discovery that the self
is 'nothing', is not a substance but a set of perpetually open
possibilities. Thus at a deep level a certain agreement underlies
Sartre's and Goffman's surface disagreements; and they agree in
nothing more than this, that both see the self as entirely set over
against the social world.71
Dan-Cohen replicates the radical autonomy of the self in his
theoretical account of community.
When individuals ... efface all distance between themselves and
their communal roles, then the system of interlocking roles, which
66 Id.
67 See id. at 1657 ("[T]he role's requirements may coincide, of course, in general
or in any specific instance with my wants and desires. But this coincidence is, in
principle, adventitious .... ").
6 What distinguishes a role as non-detached is only that the self's "will is identical
(within the role's domain) with the role's requirements." Id. at 1656 (emphasis added).
69 Id. at 1655.
70 A. MACINTYRE, supra note 33, at 32.
71 Id.
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is the community, constitutes a configuration of partially intermin-
gled personal identities. "Partially," because the individual
identities intermingle only along the dimension or within the
domain that defines and bounds the particular community that
these individuals share. But insofar as matters concerning the
community go, the members occupy a common space .... 72
The imagery here is stark. There are independent selves in their
closely held, non-detached roles. These individuals are not
themselves connected, only the roles they hold are attached to one
another. The attachments between the roles will constitute the
individuals as a group bound together "only along the dimension or
within the domain" of these role-attachments. The community is
nothing but the social space marked out by the relations between
these non-detached roles. The individuals "themselves," however,
always remain outside the group just as they always remain separate
from their roles.
To be clear just how extreme is this separation between the self,
on one hand, and even its non-detached roles and communities, on
the other, consider the following example from the very next
section of Dan-Cohen's essay:
Suppose that someone had just helped my four year-old daughter
to cross the street, as I happen to walk by.... [S]o I say to this
benefactor something like, "Thank you for helping my daughter."
The first thing to notice about this situation is this: My expression
of gratitude is strictly a matter of performing my role as father.
After all, the benefactor has not rendered any help directly to me.
It is only by virtue of my parental role, and as an aspect of it, that
it is appropriate and necessary that I thank the helper under these
circumstances. 73
Although I shall have more to say about this passage in the next
section, think about how estranged this self really is from its role as
father: Providing assistance to his daughter is no benefit to him, as
if her well-being were not integral to his happiness. This father
expresses gratitude only because it is dictated by his role and by his
self-identification as a polite person. "In this case, my general
tendency to be a polite person is sufficient to secure my perfor-
mance of such a speech act, because my being a father is simply the
aspect of my personal identity that pertains to the situation at hand."74
72 Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 1661.
73 Id. at 1662.
74 Id. (emphasis added).
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This is a desiccated view of the self. It is a self that keeps even
its most important non-detached roles at a distance. It leads,
moreover, to a complementary view of community that is unrealisti-
cally saturated. Where the individual self is always empty of social
content, the community is all social content. This vacuum of a self
has room for an autonomous will; it can don its roles or hold them
at a distance and, by this choice, participate in community. The
community, in contrast, is too full of tightly integrated social
relations between non-detached roles to contain any actual selves
capable of deviance.
If these conceptions of the self and its communities are
unrealistic, they nevertheless complement one another perfectly.
When this empty, individual self occupies one of its non-detached
roles, it becomes coextensive with that role-space and, by that fact
alone, tightly integrated into the community.75 But, although it is
not the least bit surprising, this leads Dan-Cohen to the peculiar and
faulty conclusion that a community is a monolithic system that is as
unified and well integrated as a single individual might be. Thus,
in the sentence that immediately follows the passage describing the
members of a community as occupying "a common space," Dan-
Cohen concludes: "We plausibly can imagine their public discourse
as taking place within a single member's private forum precisely
because the relevant zone of that private forum is continuous with
the community's public space."76
Now it seems to me that every part of this picture is wrong.
Public discourse is not at all like an internal monologue; even within
a community of interlocking non-detached roles, the individual
member's role-space is not identical to, but only "continuous with the
community's public space." 7 ' At the same time, the self is not at
all like an empty vessel temporarily filled up by (and then emptied
of) a succession of different non-detached roles. In the real world,
a self has many different non-detached roles-and, therefore, many
different communities-which must coexist. If we are to spatialize
the self, then it must be sectorized. 78 If that is so, then we should
expect the self to experience competition between the demands of
75 See, e.g., id. ("[O]nce I have ascertained that it is incumbent upon a father to
express gratitude under these circumstances, no further question about motivation-
i.e., why did I express gratitude-arises.").
76 Id. at 1661-62.
77 Id. at 1662 (emphasis added).
78 This is suggested by Dan-Cohen's reference to the "relevant zone of th[e]
private forum" of the self. Id.
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its different non-detached roles. And, on occasion, this would
require the self to choose between and deviate from one of its
communities.
This phenomenon of role-competition presents two serious
problems for Dan-Cohen. First, there is the question of how an
empty, autonomous self chooses among its closely held, but
potentially incommensurate non-detached roles. Second, it would
no longer be meaningful to say that community is a "common
space" and public discourse is like an internal monologue. Rather,
any community of interlocking non-detached roles would have to
contend with real world sectorized-selves who respond to the pull
of different roles (and their corresponding communities). These
riven selves would inevitably introduce fissures into any community,
which is another way of saying that there is an unavoidable plurality
that characterizes real world communities.
Dan-Cohen's theoretical account of autonomous selves who
participate in communities of neatly interlocking non-detached roles
is just that-a purely theoretical account. We can begin to improve
upon it by reconsidering the concepts of self, role, and community
in light of the kinds of social phenomena we have explored. We will
find that-in a crucial sense-self, role, and community form a single,
indivisible, ecological system. The self cannot be understood apart
from its relation to its roles and other learned modes of interaction;
those roles are modes of interaction with others that cannot be
understood separate from the community of those with whom the
self interacts; and, finally, the community cannot be detached from
the way in which it is reproduced in and by the self.
Consider first the concept of the empty self that dons its non-
detached roles and through them participates in community. Where
does this self come from? Every actual self begins as part of a
community that it does not choose and cannot escape, unless
perhaps when it is removed from one community and placed in
another. "No human infant could survive without the nurturance
of other people; its earliest experiences already provide it with an
entire repertoire of psychological mechanisms, defenses, complexes,
and personality traits."79 Thus, by the time it is old enough to
leave its family, the self is in many ways already formed. The
experience of having been parented, for example, provides a model
79 Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CALIF.
L. REV. 1441, 1486-87 (1990) (footnote omitted).
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or base from which one's future actions in similar circumstances
take form.80 In this way, one learns the behaviors that are typical
and appropriate for various contexts.81 "What this means is that,
because the subject is fashioned in its interaction with its physical
and social world, it always already contains those relationships
within it as the imaginative abstractions of those interactions."8
2
The end product is a distinctive kind of self that behaves in a
characteristic way.83
Consider again the relationship between the self and the
parental role. One can "choose" whether to become a parent, but
the conception of the parental role that informs this "choice" has
already formed and become the self.84 Once that choice is made,
the performance of that role will largely reflect the internal model
by which this self knows What it means to be a parent. Thus, if
one's "autonomous will" to get up to soothe one's crying child is
identical with the requirements of the parental role, it is because the
80 1 say "take form" rather than "follow" because the actual model that is learned
may deviate from the original in a variety of ways. I discuss this phenomenon in the
next section, where I describe the concept of "slippage." See infra notes 104-10 and
accompanying text.
81 The process can be largely unconscious, as with parenting. On other
occasions, the process can be explicit and directive, as when parents say: "Why can't
you be more likeJohnny?" Through such exemplars and paragons, we learn a great
deal of normative information about how to evaluate behavior in a wide range of
personal and professional circumstances:
We also comprehend categories in terms of individual members who
represent either an ideal or its opposite.... Scientific paradigms are also
characterized by paragons. Thus, for example, the Michaelson-Morley
experiment is the paragon of physics experiments-and is used by many
people to comprehend what a great experiment in physics is.
A great many of our actions have to do with paragons. We try to
emulate them. We are interested in the life stories of great men and
women. We use paragons as models to base our actions on. We have a
great deal of interest in experiencing paragons .... We are constantly
acquiring knowledge of paragons and regularly base our actions on that
knowledge.
G. LAKoFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL
ABOUT THE MIND 87-88 (1987).
82 Winter, supra note 79, at 1487.
8S See M. MERLEAU-PoNTY, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 455 (C. Smith
trans. 1962) ("1 am a psychological and historical structure, and have received, with
existence, a manner of existing, a style. All my actions and thoughts stand in a
relationship to this structure . . ").
84 Cf Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 1656 ("[T]here are pretty clear social norms
that regulate role-distance in these instances. To be a parent, characteristically, is to
enact a non-detached role.").
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self has introjected that role and made those requirements its
own.
85
Much of this is familiar to us as the concept of a role model.
We frequently miss the more profound implications of the concept,
however, because we think of a role model as something external to
the self. Yet, the power of a role model is internal-as we experience
when we suddenly find ourselves sounding just like our parents or,
in a moment of self-conscious reflection, we realize that the way in
which we taught a class, made a point, or handled a question was
exactly the way in which a favorite or influential teacher would have
done it. It is in just this way that the self is constituted by and
cannot be separated from its roles and other models. A "self" is a
thickly textured complex of learned modes of interaction with the
physical and social world; both the "self" and its "roles" are largely
matters of what in psychology is called "internalization."8 6
This emphasis on internalization seems to run counter to what
is intuitively correct about the distinction between detached and
non-detached roles: Some roles are more peripheral to and others
" Here, then, is our first example of slippage. Dan-Cohen uses an example of a
father who comforts his child. This is consistent with contemporary practice. Yet,
most of us had fathers who left the bulk of nurturance to our mothers. Thus our
contemporary idea of fatherhood includes actions that were formerly confined to
motherhood. But, since we men also had mothers, we have an experiential base for
assuming a more nurturant role. See N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF
MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 218 (1978) ("Anyone
who has good primary relationships has the foundation for nurturance and love
.... "). When as adults we come to see traditional gender roles as wrong and
inegalitarian, we can draw upon our childhood experience ofhavingbeen "mothered"
to begin to reformulate our sense of a father's role.
Even so, old models-like old habits-do not simply disappear. From the
standpoint of our conscious normative commitments, we can make use of our earliest
experience of nurturance to begin to reformulate traditional roles. But we cannot
transform entrenched ways of being-in-the-world solely by this act of will. See id. at
215 ("The sex-gender system is continually changing, as it responds to and affects
other aspects of social and economic organization. Yet it stays the same in
fundamental ways."). In fact, we know-or, rather, woren know-that change in these
deep-seated social roles comes much more slowly. See Belkin, Bars to Equality of Sexes
Seen as Eroding Slowly, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1 ("Men, while
generally expressing support for women's pursuit of equality, said there had been
more changes than women saw, with less cost to women than women reported. They
suggested they had overcome sexism more thoroughly than women acknowledged,
and they saw less need for further changes than women did.").
For a further discussion of the "adversity" that afflicts efforts at social
transformation and its relationship to a theory of the subject that recognizes the
"sedimentation" of thought, see Winter, supra note 79, at 1485-1505.
86 See R. SCHAFER, ASPECTS OF INTERNALIZATION 8-16 (1968).
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more constitutive of one's sense of self. But the contradiction is
only apparent, an entailment of the peculiar spatialization of self
and role. We need not think of internalization as an in-or-out, all-
or-nothing process-either I internalize a role and it becomes "me"
or it remains outside and detached-as if the self were just an empty
container to be filled by its roles. Rather, the point of seeing the
self as a complex of modes of interaction is to understand that any
given role is just one of the many modes of interaction that make
up the thick texture of the self. The distinction between detached
and non-detached roles that we do experience is a function of what
is internalized. Some roles, like that of a bank customer,8 7 are in
their very acquisition taken on as only superficial aspects of the self.
Others, like parenthood, are assimilated as integral to the self. This
variability in role acquisition is not an essential characteristic of
particular roles. Rather, the difference that we experience in the
centrality or marginality of our various roles is a function of factors
like role-duration, role-motivation, and the timing and method of
role-acquisition. The role of bank customer, for example, is
relatively episodic and incidental to the main concerns of one's life.
Conversely, a role that is expressly intended either to organize large
portions of a person's life (as when one becomes part of a profes-
sion) or to give it meaning (as when a profession is also a vocation)
is more likely to become integral to the self. So, too, roles acquired
in early childhood (as in the case of parenting) and basic modes of
interaction (whether one is characteristically passive or aggressive,
interactive or withdrawn) will become deeply entrenched and
constitutive of one's self.
From this account of every self as necessarily a situated-self with
a particular social history, one might conclude that every self must
be a "unique" individual whose "content" is entirely contingent
upon its peculiar life experiences. But this conclusion would
mistake social construction for solipsism. The roles and other
modes of interaction that constitute the "self" are acquired through
interaction with others who themselves, in turn, have acquired those
roles in the same way. Thus, the interactions necessarily take place
in an already existing social context in which the actions and roles
are already endowed with social meaning.8 8 In this sense, all social
87 Cf Gabel, supra note 29, at 1567-68 ("As I move toward [the teller] from my
place in line, I feel myself becoming a 'customer' of 'the bank'.....).
88 See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 17, at 54 ("[E]ven ... a solitary
individual... will habitualize his activity in accordance with biographical experience
CONTINGENCY AND COMMUNITY
roles are like MacIntyre's notion of character in that "a knowledge
of the [role] provides an interpretation of the actions of those
individuals who have assumed the [role]. It does so precisely
because those individuals have used the very same knowledge to
guide and to structure their behavior."8 9 It is for this reason that
the end product is -best described as a "kind of self."90
This means that what binds one person to another in a commu-
nity is not the attachment between their respective non-detached
roles, but rather the fact that they share the same way of under-
standing each other's performance of those roles and other modes
of interaction. That is, they have learned and therefore share
common ways of understanding and living in a world. They
maintain this community by their mutual enactment of these roles
or by their complementary and reciprocal engagement on the basis
of these understandings. 91 There is, therefore, no separation
between the self and its communities. 92 Self and community are
mutually constitutive.
III. PUTING COMMUNITY BACK INTO COMMUNICATION
I have, so far, focussed on processes of internalization and said
very little about the role of imagination. Imagination has neverthe-
less been an implicit part of the account. Once we have made the
connection explicit, we will have established why normative practice
is necessarily contingent upon community.
I complete the argument in the subsections that follow. First,
I show why an understanding of a role as a mode of interaction with
a community of others leads to the conclusion that internalization
is an imaginative process. I then explore the implications of this
insight for the concept of community. The introduction of
imagination into the account provides the basis for a more realistic,
robust picture of community that explains the inevitable plurality
of a world of social institutions preceding his solitude .. . ."). There is, however,
nothing fixed, objective or invariable about this social meaning. This is the
significance of the concept of "slippage" discussed below.
89 A. MACINTYRE, supra note 33, at 27.
go See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
91 See Winter, supra note 79, at 1488-89.
92 See M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SENSE AND NoN-SENSE 128-29 (H. Dreyfus & P. Dreyfus
trans. 1964) ("Society for man is not an accident he suffers but a dimension of his
being. He is not in society as an object is in a box; rather, he assumes it by what is
innermost in him."); see also Winter, supra note 15, at 1135 ("[C]ulture is both 'in' us
and that which we are embedded within.").
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within any community. But, at the same time that we find that
imagination plays an indispensable part in the maintenance of
community, we will find as well that community is essential to the
coherence of normative practice.
A. Internalization and Imagination
Although it is conventional to speak of a role as something that
can be "acquired" and "internalized," it is important not to make
the mistake of reification.9 3 A role is not a unitary, static, or
invariable "thing" but a dynamic pattern of conduct. The function
of a role is to shape an array of interactions with others-parent with
child, professor with students, corporate manager with subordi-
nates-under conditions that vary in their particulars from circum-
stance to circumstance. It follows from this that internalization
cannot be a matter of linear representation or simple reproduction.
For if it were, the "object" of this introjection could not enable the
kind of subsequent adaptive behavior that is characteristic of a role.
We can see this even at the level of one of the constituent
practices that, together with many others, might comprise a role.
When, for example, we initiate a child or a student to a new
practice like swinging a bat or writing a brief, we say "Do it like this"
and not "Mimic me motion for motion [or line for line]." If our
pupil tries to reproduce our motions or style exactly, we know that
the result will be woodenly self-conscious and not at all like what we
are trying to impart.
Initiation is the difficult process we know it to be precisely
because an adaptive, interactive practice like batting or brief-writing
is not a determinate set of' actions that can be reproduced in a
mechanical, point-for-point fashion. To connect with the ball, the
batter must coordinate her swing in response to the actions of the
pitcher and to her perceptions of the velocity and trajectory of the
ball. Similarly, the advocate must structure her arguments in
response to those of an opponent while simultaneously taking into
account the available interpretations both of the facts and of the
legal doctrine that will be credible and persuasive to the decision-
maker. As a consequence, there can never be an exact correspon-
93 For a discussion of the cognitive metaphors that structure this way of
conceptualizing ideas and of the epistemic dangers of failing to recognize their
metaphoricity, see Winter, Death Is the Mother of Metaphor (forthcoming 1991) (on file
with the author).
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dence between that which is internalized and that upon which the
internalization is based. To the contrary, initiation is a matter of
repeated practice precisely because what the beginner is trying to
learn is an abstraction of the teacher's actions: a way in which she
can act effectively under similar-which is also to say slightly
different-circumstancqs. What the beginner seeks is a model for
subsequent behavior.
The usefulness of a model is that it can be extended to new and
different contexts.94 Thus, the process by which we acquire and
extend models can only be described as imaginative.95 This is so
in two different senses. First, it is imaginative in the sense that it is
notmerely representational but involves generalization or schemati-
zation, enabling the extension and application of a model to diverse
particulars. Second, and more basically, it is imaginative in the
sense that the process of acquiring and extending a model is to a
large degree imagistic.96 Whether one is learning a model or
applying it, the basic capacity that one is using is the ability to
recognize patterns.97 Thus, one "has" a model only when one is
able to recognize in the teacher's actions a pattern that does not
depend on the detailed particulars of the original. With that
knowledge "in hand," the person is then able to recognize other
94 Much the same is true of language. To learn a language is to acquire the ability
to use words in many different contexts, which is one reason that language cannot be
a matter of one-to-one correspondence with a world (or even with a world as specified
under one set of culturally relative descriptions). Instead, linguistic phenomena are
better accounted for in terms of the extension of imaginative devices such as
metaphor, metonymy, and idealized cognitive models. See G. LAKOFF, supra note 81,
at 68-114, discussed in Winter, supra note 15, at 1142-59.
95 The concept of "imagination" invoked here is not the conventional under-
standing of imagination as a random, innovative, originary capacity. Rather, I am
drawing on a growing body of empirical and theoretical work that points to the
conclusion that the human brain processes information imagistically and cross-
modally. See G. EDELMAN, THE REMEMBERED PRESENT: A BIOLOGICAL THEORY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS (1989); M.JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF
MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987); see also S. KOSSYLN, IMAGE AND MIND
317-406 (1980) (describing the use of visual images as a tool of cognitive abilities).
9 The imagistic is "independent of any particular sensory modality" and extends
beyond the visual to include the kinesthetic and spatio-temporal such as position,
orientation, shape, movement, and velocity. G. LAKOFF, supra note 81, at 445. The
cross-modal nature of these "images" has been demonstrated by mental imagery
experiments conducted with people blind from birth, which have replicated the
results obtained with sighted subjects. See id. at 445-46.
97 "[W]e do not have pure unstructured perceptions and images .... In perceiving
and in formingimages, we impose a great deal of image-schematic structure. It is this
image-schematic structure that allows us to categorize what we perceive." Id. at 455.
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circumstances as "similar" and to reenact the practice or role in a
manner appropriate to the specific circumstances.
It may seem that the idea that images and patterns are central
to the process of model acquisition is applicable only to purely
physical skills like batting and not to more abstract cognitive
operations. But the argument is the same in both cases: To the
extent that "higher" order processes like conceptualization and
categorization are adaptive-that is, enabling successful application
to contingent and changing situations-they must be associative and
analogical. It follows that these processes are also structured by
means of models, or related cognitive operations not dependent on
content and correspondence. 98
Recent advances in cognitive theory suggest that the very
capacity of the brain to recognize patterns and form concepts
depends on these imagistic structures of bodily experience and their
cross-modal linkages in neural processes. 99 These basic image-
patterns or schemata provide the predicate for conceptual metaphors
that organize diverse areas of human interaction. Thus, for
example, the very idea that a role can be "seen" as a "pattern" of
actions is a metaphoric schematization of otherwise discrete actions
and relations. Even highly abstract conceptual skills like legal
writing and reasoning are structured by these image-based concep-
tions. We have seen one exmmple in Dan-Cohen's spatialization of
the concepts of "self" and "role," 00 and much the same can be
98 If one could define the right logical connections, conceptualization and
categorization could be a matter of necessary and sufficient criteria. But the evidence
against that view is substantial. See id. at 12-57, 136-52, 185-205. In any event, no
such view is possible without a workable correspondence view of meaning. See
Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639, 650-51 (1990).
9 Edelman explains some of these advances:
[B]ecause concepts are considered to require the mapping (and therefore
the classification) of global mappings, the use of image schemata related to
bodily states in the organization of thought and language is an expected
characteristic in conscious organisms. Image schemata involve concepts
connected to positions or states of the body as it relates to objects or
events-for example, "obstacle," "resistance," "object," "motion," "contain-
ment," and "blockage." The evidence that image schemata are developed
in humans comes from the classic studies of Head and from more recent
analyses like those of Johnson and of Spelke. Such schemata, frequently
reflected as metaphors in the language ofHoro sapiens, may already function
in animals with conceptual capabilities and primary consciousness.
G. EDELMAN, supra note 95, at 195 (footnote omitted) (discussing M.JOHNSON, supra
note 95; Spelke, The Origins ofPhysical Knowledge, in THOUGHT WITHOUT LANGUAGE
168 (L. Weiskrantz ed. 1988)).
100 See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
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demonstrated with more classic examples of conventional legal
reasoning.10 1
Notwithstanding their origin in embodied action, these image-
schemata (and, afortiori, their metaphorical extensions) are neither
biologically innate nor predetermined. They are, rather, learned
through interaction with one's physical and social environment. 10 2
It is their repetition and reenforcement through bodily experience
that gives them their potency as organizing schemata. At the
abstract level, much the same is true for the extended metaphors
and models that they structure; as these models are successfully
enacted in social life, they gain a measure of psychological "solidity"
as a consequence of the confirmation and reenforcement received
from others.10 3 This provides some further insight why initiation
into a role is neither automatic nor mechanical and linear, but must
be experienced and practiced.
Let me summarize what we have accomplished so far. An
understanding of a role as a mode of interaction with others
necessarily implies that a role is not a determinate "thing," but
rather a dynamic, adaptive pattern of actions and responses.
Consequently, to speak of a role or a model as something that is
internalized is just a conventional way of describing a more complex
process that is necessarily imaginative. To acquire a role, one must
abstract from practice, repetition, and experience a generalized,
imagistic pattern of behavior that does not correlate with the
original in a one-to-one fashion.
101 For example, the structure of ChiefJustice Hughes's reasoning in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), turns on the source-path-goal schema
and the metaphors for commerce that he is able to elaborate from it. See Winter,
supra note 15, at 1199-1206. For a discussion of how the general category of
"narrative" and the subcategory of "argument" are both structured in terms of a few
basic image-schemata, see Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal
Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2225 (1989).
102 See G. EDELMAN, supra note 95, at 167 ("[T]he density, relationships, and
character of such 'images' are determined practically completely by interactions with
the world and its objects and arrangements."); M. JOHNSON, supra note 95, at 29
("These patterns emerge as meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of our
bodily movements through space, our manipulation of objects, and our perceptual
interactions.").
103 See M. MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 83, at 441 ("[W]e must recognize a sort of
sedimentation of our life: an attitude towards the world, when it has received
frequent confirmation, acquires a favoured status for us.").
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B. Slippage
I have argued that there is never an exact correspondence, but
rather an imaginative relationship between the model that is
internalized and the behavior that it is modeled upon. If this is
correct, it means that the processes of cultural learning and
reproduction are characterized by slippage.10 4 If we conceptualize
a community as a group of people who share common ways of
understanding and living in a physical and social world, then the
existence of slippage will mean that community is necessarily a
relative phenomenon characterized by degrees of plurality and
divergence.
Some of the causes of slippage can be readily described.
10 5
Suppose that all the parents in a community shared precisely the
same idealized conception of parenthood. Their children would
nevertheless derive somewhat different models of parenthood for
at least three reasons. First, it is unlikely that the first generation
would have enacted the parental role in precisely the same idealized
form-at least given what we know about human fallibility and the
variability in talents, intelligence, and the like. Second, even if all
the parents in the first generation were equally capable, they still
would not enact the parental role in precisely the same way. During
the course of raising their children, these parents would inevitably
confront different circumstances that require innovation in their
enactment of the parental role. This follows from the concept of a
role as a pattern of adaptive behaviors:
Human rationality is a dynamic process of meaningful interaction
in and with an environment that is constantly in flux. Which is to
say that, whatever our "built-up predispositions," we inevitably
encounter situations that we "have previously never met or
thought of." In this context, to react along the lines marked out
104 In his contribution to this symposium, Pierre Schlag uses the term "slippage"
differently to describe the phenomenon in which the assumptions and beliefs that are
consciously held with regard to one intellectual domain are unconsciously projected
into and reproduced in another, putatively separate, domain-i.e., that they "slip into"
another supposedly unrelated set of social interactions. Slippage of this sort also
occurs from the intellectual to the material domain and back again as the assumptions
that are inscribed in material conditions influence and structure concept formation.
See Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 909-11 (1991).
I would discuss these phenomena in terms of projection, transference, and
sedimentation. See Winter, supra note 79, at 1487-92.
105 There are forms and causes of slippage other than those I describe below. For
an example, see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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by our sedimented knowledges is unavoidably to act imaginatively
in a new circumstance, reasoning in terms of a known one.10
6
Consequently, the social experiences from which different members
of the second generation will abstract their models of the parental
role will not be exactly the same.
Third, there is no determinate regularity in the process of
internalization by which the second generation gains its models of
parenthood. The chief attribute of a model is that it is an imagina-
tive abstraction from, and not a mere reproduction of, the original
behavior upon which it is based. Thus, even if all the parents in the
first generation enacted their roles in the same way, the models
internalized by the second generation would not necessarily be
identical. ° 7 For example, some members of the second genera-
tion will form models that are reactive rather than imitative.10 8
Thus, there would be slippage even if the underlying social
experiences were somehow exactly the same.
If we combine even these three forms of slippage and multiply
the effects across several generations, the result will be a group that
no longer shares precisely the same idealized conceptions of
parenthood that once characterized their forebears as a community.
The cohesiveness of the successor group will be a function of the
degree of similarity remaining among the surviving conceptions of
the parental role. We can nevertheless expect that there will be
some degree of similarity, and not rampant incommensurability, for
several reasons. First, much about the enactment of the parental
role will remain the same despite changes even in important
particulars: By and large, parents will still be feeding and changing
their babies, responding to them when they cry, etc. Second,
because a model is an imaginative abstraction and not a copy, not
every difference in the content of the parent-child experience will
yield dissimilar internalizations. 10 9 Third, to the extent that there
106 Winter, supra note 79, at 1491 (footnote omitted) (quoting Llewellyn, The
Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 27 (1934)).
107 Cf. N. CHODOROW, supra note 85, at 216-17 ("Psychoanalysis does show that
we are formed in crucial ways by the time we are five, but it ... argues against a
unilateral model of social determination, and for the variation and creativity in what
people make of their early childhood experiences . . ").F08 Cf. Winter, supra note 98, at 650 n.57 ("It is rather like the analysand who
rejected the therapist's insight that she was powerfully influenced by her mother.
'That's not truel' she said. 'I am nothing like my mother. In fact, I am exactly the
oppositel'").
109 This is the flip side of the phenomenon of "nondeterminacy"-that is, the way
in which a single image-based model can structure very different substantive
1991]
998 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:963
are dissimilarities in their models of the parental role, every set of
parents will have to work out some accommodation between them;
as a result, their enactment of the parental role will tend to
converge upon what is similar or complementary in their intern-
alizations.110 Fourth, and. in much the same vein, any set of
parents will interact with a variety of other social actors and receive
substantive input from many different social sources-their own
parents, the children's teachers, state gun control statutes-that will
shape and constrain their enactment of the parental role along
common or complementar lines.
For these reasons, the processes of cultural learning and
reproduction will be characterized by slippage rather than outright
incommensurability. This means that different members of the
community should be able to interact in a meaningful manner
despite the differences in their internalized models. But, there will
be gaps between them-gaps of understanding, discrepancies of
values, lacunae in performance. A clash between these competing
modes of interaction will open a normative space that must be
bridged. What conditions will best foster resolution of these
conflicts?
It would seem that, in answering this question, one must first
know which tack the participants will take. Will they be oriented
strategically toward success or will they be more ambitious and try
to reach agreement through. dialogue and understanding? Suppose
the participants opt for strategic interaction. The more each
participant knows about or is able to appreciate the other's
understandings, values, and resulting perspective, the better
positioned she will be to manipulate the other successfully and
achieve her strategic objective. If one participant is self-conscious
and reflective about her knowledge of the other, she will have a
substantial advantage in their interaction even when their knowl-
edge of each other is equal. By the same token, if they each try self-
consciously to use their knowledge of the other to strategic
advantage, but they possess only imperfect knowledge of the other,
the strategic advantage will lie with the participant with the better
understanding of the other's perspective. In either case, the more
knowledge one has of the other's animating models, the better she
outcomes. See Winter, supra note 101, at 2230-55.
110 Of course, one partner may dominate, imposing upon the other's model. But
this will tend to reduce slippage-and skew social evolution along different lines-
because in the case of any such family only half of the models will be enacted.
CONTINGENCY AND COMMUNITY
will be able to identify pressure points within the antagonist's
perspective that can be exploited to effectuate her strategic goal.
The availability of this knowledge of the other will be a function
both of the degree of slippage within the community and of its
pervasiveness. To the extent that the antagonists share substantially
similar models of the subject of their interaction, they will be able
more easily to apprehend the other's perspective on and under-
standing of the conflict. Even if the slippage here is great, they may
nevertheless share many other models, values, and understandings
that are relevant to and can be brought to bear upon this conflict.
If, however, the gaps are great and slippage pervasive, this knowl-
edge must be sought through an imaginative attempt to reconstruct
and apprehend the antagonist's point of view. The more one can
discover about one's antagonist-her life experiences, her previous
actions, her articulated understandings-the better one will be able
imaginatively to reconstruct her perspective and use this knowledge
to strategic advantage.
Suppose that the participants take the high road and seek
agreement through understanding instead. The less slippage, the
more cohesive the community, the more easily will they be able to
bridge the normative space between them. If the slippage is great
with respect to their models of the interaction in question, their
ability to reach consensus will be a function of the relative cohesion
with respect to the other models and values that bear upon their
conflict."n But, once again, if slippage is both substantial and
pervasive, then it will require an act of imagination in order to
bridge the gaps and achieve accord.n 2
11 Cf. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 63, 74 (1974). Felstiner notes:
Mediation ... flourishes where mediators share the social and cultural
experience of the disputants they serve, and where they bring to the
processing of disputes an intimate and detailed knowledge of the per-
spectives of the disputants. In the absence of such shared experience and
such pre-processing knowledge, the effort a mediator would have to make
to fill the gaps would be disproportionate to the social stakes involved in the
dispute.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Felstiner also points out that the importance of understanding context and
perspective is increased if one sees conflicts not merely as a matter of conflicting role
expectations but rather as a process in which "individuals ... continually redefine
themselves and their situations and realign their behavior accordingly." Id. at 74
n.16.
112 For an example, see Winter, supra note 101, at 2279.
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Agreement may be facilitated by imagination in another way. If
the community is in fact cohesive, then the participants may share
a commitment to empathize and identify with each other. This may
lead them first to explore and ultimately to appreciate the perspec-
tive of the other. Indeed, this experience of mutual recognition and
shared identification is probably the most salient characteristic of
what we ordinarily take to be a community. Thus, to return to Dan-
Cohen's example, 11 3 parents normally are moved to thank the
person who helps their child to cross the street precisely because a
benefit to one's child is experienced as if it were a benefit to
oneself. One does not do so "by virtue of my parental role, and as
an aspect of it .. .11' Rather, one thanks the benefactor by
virtue of and because the very "self" of the parent is bound up with
the well-being of his or her children. Parents identify with their
children, feel their pain, and experience theirjoy. Indeed, they are
motivated to act for them as if they were acting for themselves.
It may be rare to find this degree of empathy and community
outside the ideal family, but the point is that it is just this form of
identification and vicarious imagination that provide a group with
a self-conscious sense of community and solidarity. And this
identification comes most easily with respect to others who share
with us common ways of understanding, acting, and living in a
world. Which means that the resolution of normative conflict by
means of communitarian efforts at agreement through understand-
ing will be most effective when it takes place in the context of
already existing community.
You will have noticed, no doubt, that whether the participants
set out to resolve their controversy through strategic interaction or
through dialogue and "communicative action," the conditions of
success are exactly the same. In either case, effective and efficient
resolution will be a function of the degree to which they share
internalizations and the capacity for imagination. In either case,
community is the practical precondition for meaningful communica-
tion.
This leaves us with only the final and, by this point, all too
obvious step of the argument. As we already know from Dan-
Cohen, prescriptive normative practices like adjudication are
conventionally understood as primarily strategic forms of communi-
113 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
114 Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 1662.
CONTINGENCY AND COMMUNITY
cation. Conversely, persuasive normative practices like Michelman's
republican jurisgenesis are the political forms of communicative
action. Both are contingent on community.
IV. THE CONTINGENCY OF COMMUNITY
In our conventional understanding, community is a background
condition of social order against which individual acts of deviance
are measured. Deviance, in this view, is a failing of the self;
prescription (i.e., the law) serves as the occasional corrective that
provides the right "external" motivation. 115  Instead, I have
argued that community is located in and reproduced by a self that
cannot be abstracted from its social context nor understood apart
from it. Which means that deviance is not so much a problem of
wayward selves as it is an index of the relative degree of slippage
within a community.
Conventional normativity blames the self for processes that are
themselves dependent upon achieving and maintaining the right
kind of community. One need only look to the ghettos that so
frequently are only a stone's throw from our law schools to observe
the degree to which, in our society, slippage has become social
hemorrhage.1 16  The problem may be represented by the "No
Turn on Red" and gun control stories, but these are only the tip of
the iceberg. If, at times, the coherence and intelligibility of
normative practice within the legal academy seems in similar
jeopardy, it is for exactly the same reason: Both inside and outside
the ivory tower, the conditions of community that are necessary to
maintain its coherence are everywhere in disarray. It is not too
soon to say that we are threatened by fragmentation and social
disintegration.
I do not expect that the normative impulse will go away, nor do
I advocate that it should. But we are saddled by a futile and
increasingly counterproductive model of social order. The salient
115 In Dan-Cohen's case, for example, a community is a monolithic system of
tightly integrated non-detached roles within which persuasion should ordinarily
suffice because "insofar as matters concerning the community go, the members
occupy a common space .... " Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 1661. If there is
discord within a real world community, then it must be because a gap has opened
between one of its member selves and her putatively non-detached role. In that
event, the fault lies with the self and must be corrected by prescription. The problem
of contemporary normative practice is a problem of inducing the "proper" motivation
of the self.
116 See Finnegan, supra note 1.
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advantage of the cognitive account of community is that it offers the
potential of a more effective approach to normative practice.
"Human society is not a community of reasonable minds, and only
in fortunate countries where a biological and economic balance has
locally and temporarily been struck has such a conception of it been
possible."117 A conception of community as a set of shared
understandings located in the self can focus more productive
attention on fostering the kinds of conditions of community that
might enable a more meaningful normative practice. If the
vertiginous biological and economic imbalance in our society
threatens the coherence of normative practice, then quite a bit more
is at stake-including the very survival of our society as a democratic
one. Fragmentation and democracy cannot coexist precisely
because the common matrix is increasingly undone.
I have frequently argued that our linguistic and conceptual
capacities are grounded in our physical embodiment. 118 But if
that is all we share, communication will be very difficult and
rudimentary. To deal with the complex, intractable problems about
which real law happens, we need a lot more to go on. My point is
not that dialogue, persuasion, and normative practice are all
impossible, but that their effectiveness is contingent upon communi-
ty understood as a shared way of living in and understanding a
world. 119 This explains why my work keeps taking such a strongly
communitarian turn. Ultimately, we must come to see it is our
similar embodiment and shared social situatedness that jointly
provide the common grounds upon which the work of empathy
can-and must-be done.
117 M. MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 83, at 56.
118 Se, e.g., Winter, supra note 15, at 1129-50.
119 See Michelman, supra note 21, at 1513 ("The persuasive character of the process
depends on the normative efficacy of some context that is everyone's-of the past that
is constitutively present in and for every self as language, culture, worldview, and
political memory.").
